Biometric systems have been recently developed and used for authentication or identification in several scenarios, ranging from institutional purposes (border control) to commercial applications (point of sale). Two main issues are raised when such systems are applied: reliability and privacy for users. Multi-biometric systems, i.e. systems involving more than a biometric trait, increase the security of the system, but threaten users' privacy, which are compelled to release an increased amount of sensible information. In this paper, we propose a multi-biometric system, which allows the extraction of secure identifiers and ensures that the stored information does not compromise the privacy of users' biometrics. Furthermore, we show the practicality of our approach, by describing an effective construction, based on the combination of two iris templates and we present the resulting experimental data.
Introduction
Nowadays, biometric systems are deployed in several commercial, institutional, and forensic applications as a tool for identification and authentication [1] , [2] . The advantages of such systems over traditional authentication techniques, like the ones based on the possession (of a password or a token), come from the fact that identity is established on the basis of physical or behavioral characteristics of the subject taken into consideration and not on something he/she carries. In fact, biometrics cannot be lost or stolen, they are difficult to copy or reproduce, and in general they require the presence of the user when the biometric authentication procedure takes place.
However, side to side with the widespread diffusion of biometrics an opposition grows towards the acceptance of the technology itself. Two main reasons might motivate such resistance: the reliability of a biometric system and the possible threatens to users' privacy. In fact, a fault in a biometric system, due to a poor implementation or to an overestimation of its accuracy could lead to a security breach. Moreover since biometric traits are permanently associated to a person, releasing the biometric information acquired during the enrollment can be dangerous, since an impostor could reuse that information to break the biometric authentication process. For this reason, privacy agencies of many countries have ruled in favor of a legislation which limits the biometric information that can be centrally stored or carried on a personal ID. For example, templates, e.g. mathematical information derived from a fingerprint, are retained instead of the picture of the fingerprint itself. Also un-encrypted biometrics are discouraged.
A possible key to enhance the reliability of biometric systems might be that of simultaneously using different biometric traits. Such systems are termed in literature multi-biometric [3] and they usually rely on a combination of one of several of the followings: (i) multiple sensors, (ii) multiple acquisitions (e.g., different frames/poses of the face), (iii) multiple traits (e.g., an eye and a fingerprint), (iv) multiple instances of the same kind of trait (e.g., left eye, and right eye). As a rule of thumb, the performances of two of more biometric systems which each operate on a single trait might be enhanced when the same systems are organized in a single multimodal one. This is easy to understand if we refer to the risk of admitting an impostor: two or more different subsequent verifications are obviously more difficult to tamper with than a single one (AND configuration). But other less obvious advantages might occur. Population coverage might be increased, for example, in an OR configuration since some individuals could not have one biometric traits (illnesses, injuries, etc.). Or the global fault tolerance of the system might be enhanced in the same configuration, since, if one biometric subsystem is not working properly (e.g., a sensor problem occurred), the multimodal system can still keep working using the remaining biometric submodules. On the other hand, the usage of multimodal biometric systems has also some important drawbacks related to the higher cost of the systems, and user perception of larger invasiveness for his/her privacy.
In the following, we will derive a multi-biometric authentication system which limits the threats posed to the privacy of users while still benefiting from the increase reliability of multiple biometrics. It was introduced in [4] and it is based on the secure sketch, a cryptographic primitive introduced by Dodis et al. in [5] . In fact, a main problem in using biometrics as cryptographic keys is their inherent variability in subsequent acquisitions. The secure sketch absorbs such variability to retrieve a fixed binary string from a set of similar biometric readings.
In literature biometric authentication schemes based on secure sketches have been presented and applied to face and iris biometrics [6], [7] . Our proposal is generally applicable to a wider range of biometric traits and, compared to previous works, exploits multimodality in innovative way. In the following we describe the proposed construction and show its application to the case where two biometrics are used, the right and left iris. Iris templates are extracted from the iris images and used in the enrolment phase to generate a secure identifier, where the biometric information is protected and any malicious attempt to break the users' privacy is prevented.
A Multimodal Sketch Based (MSB) Verification Scheme
The MSB verification scheme we propose is composed of two basic modules: the first one (enroll module) creates an identifier (ID) for each user starting from the biometric samples. The ID can then be stored and must be provided during the verification phase. The second one, the (verification module) performs the verification process starting from the novel biometric readings and the information contained into the ID. Verification is successful if the biometric matching succeeds when comparing the novel reading with the stored biometrics, concealed into the ID.
